Mike Calvert

Brigadier James Michael Calvert, (6 March 1913 – 26 November 1998) was a British Army officer who was involved in special operations in Burma during the Second World War. He participated in both Chindit operations and was instrumental in popularizing the unorthodox ideas of Orde Wingate. He frequently led attacks from the front, a practice that earned him the nickname amongst the men under his command of "Mad Mike."

Calvert's post-war service is often described in unflattering terms, but in many ways he can be seen as having a profound and lasting impact on the post-war development of the SAS.

Early life Calvert was born at Rohtak in India, son of a member of the Indian Civil Service. He was educated at Bradfield College and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, from which he was commissioned as a subaltern into the British Army's Royal Engineers as a professional soldier in February 1933. For a time he was the Army's middleweight boxing champion. He spent a year reading for the Mechanical Engineering Tripos at St. John's College, Cambridge.

After retreating from the viaduct, Calvert participated in a deception operation involving the loss of a set of false papers to the Japanese. Calvert's unit finally retreated to India at the very rear of the army, often behind the Japanese lines.

Operation Longcloth In India, Calvert reunited with the equally unorthodox Wingate, and the two became firm friends. Calvert led one of the company-sized columns in Operation Longcloth, Wingate's first Chindit operation in 1943. This was a long-range penetration operation behind enemy lines, which put great demands on the endurance of all who took part. Calvert was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for his achievements on the operation. His column achieved the greatest amount of demolition of the Japanese lines of communication, and reached India intact with the fewest casualties of those in the force.

Operation Thursday The Fly-In Calvert commanded the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade in Operation Thursday, the much larger second Chindit operation. His brigade spearheaded the airborne landings deep in the Japanese rear. The operation was staged from Lalaghat, with D-Day fixed for 5 March. That morning, one of General Philip Cochran's B-25 Mitchells flew over and photographed the landing zones. Wingate had ordered that no aircraft should fly over the landing zones, lest the operation be betrayed, but Cochran was not directly under Wingate's command and felt that launching the operation without accurate intelligence was a dangerous gamble. The photographs clearly showed that one of landing sites selected, codenamed Piccadilly, was unusable.

It was at this dramatic moment, with everyone keyed up and ready to go, that the aerial photographs arrived. They showed that primary landing site Broadway was clear, but Piccadilly had been blocked by tree trunks; no gliders would land there that night. The general opinion was that the Japs had realized the possibilities of Piccadilly as a landing area and had deliberately blocked it, though some time later we discovered that the explanation was much simpler: Burmese woodmen had laid out their trees to dry in the clearing.

Wingate was enraged by Cochran's actions but admitted that the danger was real. He and Calvert weighed the options. The danger of executing a potentially compromised operation were substantial, but any delay threatened to push back the window of opportunity by at least a month. Of the three planned sites only two were available; Calvert suggested the plan be further altered and the entire brigade flown into Broadway. He said, "I am prepared to take the whole of my brigade into Broadway and do without [second landing site] Piccadilly." Calvert later wrote, "We had taken into account that [third landing site] Chowringhee was to the east of the Irrawaddy while Broadway was west of the river. I told Wingate, 'I don't want to split my brigade either side of the Irrawaddy. I am prepared to take all the brigade into Broadway alone and take the consequence of a slower build-up.'" Lieutenant-General William Slim "asked Calvert...and found him strongly against [using] Chowringhee." Further discussion with Slim and Wingate clinched the matter: "it was to be Broadway alone. I was nervous as bales, I imagine we all were, but we all knew we had to go...In any case Broadway was clear and I could really see no reason why we should not go in there just because Piccadilly was blocked."

Calvert transmitted the prearranged signal "Soya Link", the most despised of ration items, to stop all flying, but at 6:30am on 6 March he radioed the code words "Pork Sausage" to resume flights into Broadway. A strip for C-47s was in place that evening, and supplies came rushing in. Calvert lost no time in organizing reconnaissance missions and fortifying Broadway. By 13 March the build-up was complete. In seven nights about 9,000 men, 1,350 animals, 250 tons of supplies and weapons had landed behind enemy lines in Burma.

Broadway On 17 March Calvert led a bayonet charge against Japanese positions shielded by a sunken road and a steep hill crowned with a pagoda. He noticed that friendly forces nearby were drawing heavier fire. In fact, elements of the South Staffordshire Regiment had dug in adjacent to a Japanese unit. Neither force was aware of the other. Deciding that something had to be done, he elected to make a frontal assault:

I saw something had to be done pretty quickly, so I shouted to Freddie that we were going to charge. I then told everyone that we were going to charge the Pagoda Hill. There were reinforcements on our left flank who would charge as well. So, standing up, I shouted out 'Charge' in the approved Victorian manner, and ran down the hill...Half of the South Staffords joined in. Then looking back I found a lot had not. So I told them to bloody well 'Charge, what the hell do you think you're doing.' So they charged. Machine-gunners, mortar teams, all officers – everybody who was on that hill

The fighting quickly degenerated into a free-for-all. Calvert characterized the action as an "extraordinary mêlée...everyone shooting, bayoneting, kicking at everyone else, rather like an officers' guest night." Afterward, "the hill was a horrid sight, littered with Jap dead, and already the ones who had been killed there earlier in the day were black with flies. Stretcher-bearers were removing our wounded and our mercifully very few dead".

Shortly after this action a lieutenant in the South Staffordshire Regiment, Norman Durant, wrote a compelling description of Calvert in a letter to his parents:

His hair flops over his forehead, and he has a disconcerting habit of staring at you when you speak to him and yet not appearing to hear a word. His lectures were always painfully slow and hesitant and during training he gave the impression of taking a long time to make up his mind; in action things were very different. He knows all the officers in the brigade and many of the senior NCOs, and his manner and attitude are always the same if he is talking to a CO, a subaltern or a private...

Calvert's dedication to the troops under his command was one of his most visible attributes. According to David Rooney he was "one of the most successful of the Chindit leaders [and] showed his greatness as a commander by reminding his men that, however bad things were for them, things were probably much worse for the enemy."

White City The brigade then captured and held a position near Mawlu. Calvert "saw that Mawlu [the location of the block] was the crucial point for road and rail traffic and determined to build up a defensive box there." Because of the supply drop parachutes adorning the surrounding jungle, it became known as the White City. This fortified position blocked Japanese road and rail communications to their northern front for over two months. A large rectangle, 1,000 by 800 yards, White City was quickly identified by the Japanese as a threat. Probing attacks on 18, 19, and 20 March inflicted a handful of casualties, but were beaten back without significant loss. The Japanese mounted a serious attack on the night of 21 March that resulted in "very confused close-quarter fighting" that lasted all night. Two Japanese light machine guns were established in the block; a dawn attack led by flamethrower-equipped infantry displaced the Japanese, driving them outside the perimeter. Calvert was instrumental in orchestrating the counterattacks and was frequently under fire.

After repulsing numerous nighttime attacks, Calvert had two relatively quiet weeks to fortify White City. Under his direction a thick hedge of barbed wire was put in place and surrounded with mines and booby traps. Firing positions were dug in and camouflaged; reinforced with logs and earth, these positions were invisible and all-but impenetrable. Calvert also established a defensive fire plan to coordinate machine gun and mortar fire. Some 2-pounder anti-tank guns arrived on 29 March and were quickly put in place. These were followed by engineers who built a landing strip capable of handling C-47 cargo aircraft, which delivered more artillery. White City was eventually defended by four anti-tank guns, six Bofors 40 mm autocannons and four 25-pounders. Calvert had a not insubstantial arsenal at his disposal.

On 6 April the White City again came under attack. The Japanese shelled and bombed the block throughout the afternoon. Calvert recalled that the terrain combined with meticulous attention to detail in constructing the positions provided shelter, and that casualties were low. The only effective weapon the Japanese possessed was a 6-inch mortar, an old coastal defence piece they had laboriously dragged through the jungle to bombard the block. The mortar fired a bomb four and a half feet long that was in flight for more than 30 seconds. Calvert described the mortar as "the bane of our existence." The Japanese brought forward two light tanks; these were quickly destroyed with 2-pounder anti-tank guns. Confident in the block's ability to withstand any attack, Calvert's only concern was his rapidly dwindling supply of ammunition. Machine gun ammunition was being used at a frantic pace. In all, some 700,000 rounds of Vickers machine gun ammunition were dropped into White City. Calvert requested that supply drops contain less food and more ammunition. Only when the brigade major "heaved out his revolver, stuck it in my stomach and said, 'I'll shoot you if you don't go back. I was with him when he was killed'" did Calvert resume the retreat.

Mogaung

Calvert (left) giving orders during the capture of Mogaung in June 1944. In May, the Chindit brigades moved north. The monsoon had broken and floods impeded the Chindits' operations. On 27 May, Major-General Walter Lentaigne (who had taken command of the Chindits after Wingate was killed in an air crash in late March) ordered Calvert's brigade to capture the town of Mogaung. Calvert at first promised to capture Mogaung by 5 June. However, the Japanese reinforced the defenders of the town until it was held by a force of four battalions from the 53rd Division. As Calvert's brigade tried to advance over flooded flat ground, they suffered severely from shortage of rations, exhaustion and disease. Finally, Calvert was reinforced by a Chinese battalion and put in an all-out assault on 24 June which captured almost all of the town. The last resistance was cleared by 27 June. Calvert's brigade had suffered 800 battle casualties in the siege, half of its strength. Of the remainder, only 300 men were left fit to fight.

The American General Joseph Stilwell, who had overall command of the Chindits, announced via the BBC that the Chinese troops of his Northern Combat Area Command had captured Mogaung. Calvert signalled to Stilwell's headquarters "Chinese reported taking Mogaung. My Brigade now taking umbrage."

SAS Operations Calvert at the ceremony marking the passing of 3 and 4 SAS to France in October 1945. Calvert was evacuated to Britain on medical grounds (ironically following an accidental injury) in September 1944. To his dismay, the Chindits were disbanded while he was still in hospital.

By March 1945 he was in command of the Special Air Service Troops, a brigade formed by bringing together British, French and Belgian SAS units in 1944 to serve in the Second Front in Europe. There was some controversy when the brigade was formed, Bill Stirling objecting to the proposed role of the SAS and resigning from the regiment. There were also mixed views on Calvert's appointment, as, unlike many other decorated SAS officers at the time, he had no prior SAS, desert or European experience. Calvert knew the Stirling brothers from his time instructing Commandos in 1940.

On taking over at a relatively quiet period for the SAS at the end of the war, Calvert said he found 1 and 2 SAS "living rather a country house existence" in Essex, "going off to the races" - they "thought they had fought their war". Calvert's orders were to "get them all together and get them into action within 3 weeks". According to Calvert, 1 SAS under Paddy Mayne and 2 SAS under Brian Franks initially resisted, putting up lots of objections. Brian Franks used his connections to complain to General Dempsey about the role; Calvert "had to give him a hell of a rocket to get him going".

Calvert oversaw Operation Howard (1SAS under Paddy Mayne in N W Germany) and Operation Amherst (British and French forces in N E Holland), before commanding 1 and 2 SAS in Operation Apostle (part of Operation Doomsday) in May 1945 in Norway. The mission was to help maintain order during the fragile early stages of peace, disarm remaining German forces, secure coastal installations, and oversee the repatriation of German and Soviet prisoners of war. Tensions soon developed with the Soviet repatriation commission, particularly when some prisoners resisted forced return to the USSR. In early July, relations between the SAS and Norwegian authorities became strained after SAS soldiers freed a comrade who had been arrested by local police—an incident later referred to as the "Battle of Bergen." When Calvert broke his leg and had to return to the UK, he was succeeded by Brigadier Guy Prendergast. Despite the challenges, the SAS brigade successfully completed its objectives and withdrew from Norway in late August 1945.

The Second World War concluded with the disbandment of SAS forces. French and Belgian SAS units returned to their national armies. Calvert was awarded a French and a Belgian Croix de Guerre for his leadership.

In late 1945 a War Office enquiry was set up (some say at Calvert's instigation) to investigate the achievements of the SAS during the war and its possible role in the future. Calvert took the lead and sent briefing notes to David and Bill Stirling, Brian Franks, Paddy Mayne and other leading Special Forces figures with suggestions as to how they might respond. The enquiry concluded that the SAS should have a role distinct from normal infantry; it should be a highly specialised force, manned by individuals who might not always fit into a normal infantry unit. The recommendation to re-form a regular unit was rejected but the formation of a territorial unit was approved: 21SAS (Artists) was established in 1947 under Brian Franks, the former CO of 2 SAS. Franks, who served as CO of 21SAS until 1950, subsequently took the lead in promoting the SAS's interests when Calvert moved on to other things, although Calvert 'kept his finger on the pulse" through his role within the Regimental Association.

Post-war service In the years after WW2, Mike Calvert was a well-known, easily recognisable military figure, famous for his actions behind enemy lines with the Chindits fighting the Japanese, and with a reputation for being a creative military planner and thinker. He could also be a controversial figure, in part because he was open, but also because of his association with the Chindits and Wingate, seen by some in the Army as divisive influences. He was a rebel, particularly when it involved criticising staff officers.

After a spell with the Royal Engineers in India (where Calvert chose to use the Sappers' and Miners' mess instead of the Senior Officers' mess), in August 1947 he attended the Army's Staff College, Camberley, where, he said, "I learned a lot, though I couldn't help arguing now and then". After passing the course, he was invited to join Field Marshal Montgomery's planning staff, where one of his tasks was to plan the logistics of a proposed landing on the coast of Malaya, followed by an advance up to Siam.

Malaya In January 1950 Calvert was asked by General Sir John Harding, at the suggestion of Field Marshal Sir William Slim, to produce a report on how to respond to the escalating violence in the Malayan Emergency. Sir John Harding was the Commander of British Forces in the Far East, Field Marshal Slim was Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Slim had fought in Burma at the same time as Calvert, and recognised Calvert as "perhaps the greatest expert on guerrilla warfare then serving in the British Army".

The Malayan Emergency was declared by the British in 1948 in response to violence from Chinese communists (originally trained by the British to fight the Japanese during WW2). The Emergency lasted until 1960. The initial phase of the Emergency between 1948 and 1950 has been described as a disorganised series of ad-hoc military measures, rather than an integrated campaign directed by a clear strategy. More than a thousand people had died, on both sides, by March 1950, and no end to the conflict was in sight. Fresh ideas were needed as much as more troops.

Calvert set off on an extensive tour of Malaya, sending interim reports to Harding as he travelled. He found the regular army poorly suited to jungle warfare, in very much the same way that Walter Walker had found in 1948 when setting up Ferret Force, and Frank Kitson was to find later in 1957 when reviewing counterinsurgency tactics. In Walker's words: "The qualities required of the real jungle fighter are not those of the elephant but rather of the poacher, gangster and cat-burglar". As the bandits retreated deeper into the jungle, it was difficult for the regular army to follow.

Calvert submitted a manuscript report direct to Harding in April 1950. He made recommendations at two levels: a high level, overarching recommendation that had to be done before all the others; and then more detailed recommendations to follow. His high-level recommendation was simple to state: "There must be one man, with one plan, and with the power to carry it out."

Briggs Plan In his biography, Calvert's Intelligence officer, Major John Woodhouse, lists six other recommendations from a copy of Calvert's report which had gone directly to Lt.- Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, the first Director of Operations: Police should stop sending patrols into jungle and concentrate on protection of civilians at jungle fringes Special Branch should be expanded Essential to move isolated Chinese, known as squatters into new villages where they could be protected – would involve hundreds of thousands of people Army to concentrate on setting ambushes near jungle edge to intercept Communists as they come out for food or offensive forays Only then, main military effort should concentrate on Johore in South Malaya with the aim of clearing the country methodically from South to North And then and only then, set up Special Force to operate for long periods in deep jungle. These Special Force operations to be complementary to those of infantry at jungle fringes.

These ideas appear in what became known as the 'Briggs Plan', put forward by Briggs in May 1950. At Slim's request, Briggs had come out of retirement to be appointed to his role in March 1950, arriving in Singapore on 3 April. The first draft of the Briggs Plan appears to have been put together in about a week, suggesting Briggs drew on and integrated existing proposals. Briggs' military role in Malaya was highly political, for example persuading Malay Sultans to make concessions to the Chinese population. Calvert described him as "a wise old man who wanted me to advise him on the Briggs Plan". Several commentators suggest that Calvert's report shaped the Briggs Plan, one even suggesting that it could be referred to as the Calvert Plan.

Calvert had put his finger on growing tensions between the military and civil administrations in Malaya. Politicians and civil administrators saw the Emergency as a predominantly military problem, to be solved by military action before civil or political change; the military recognised the limitations of military action and wanted faster civil and political change. Civil issues such as settlement and control of Chinese squatters, propaganda, immigration control and resolution of labour disputes were seen by Field Marshal Slim and General Harding as an essential part of the counterinsurgency. They wanted the tasks of controlling and protecting the population and gathering intelligence to be done by the police and the civil services. The High Commissioner and senior members of the civil service wanted the army to be responsible for these tasks, and did not want to risk a political confrontation with Malay elites, who were deeply opposed to investment and the extension of political rights to the Chinese squatters. The army, police, civil authorities and the sultans were all pulling in different directions and needed one man in charge and one plan they could all follow. Over the following year, violence increased, and tension continued to grow between civil and military administrations, to the extent that at one point Briggs even threatened to resign. Then, in October 1951, a few months before Briggs' impending retirement, the High Commissioner was killed in a terrorist attack. When Winston Churchill returned to power as British Prime Minister later that month, the decision was taken to appoint one man, General Sir Gerald Templer, as both the military Director of Operations and the civil High Commissioner, with unprecedented Emergency powers, "greater than any British soldier had enjoyed since Cromwell".

Templer took up his post in February 1952 to complete implementation of the Briggs Plan, just as Calvert had recommended. Calvert even claimed to have suggested Templer for the post when he made his original report ("because he is ruthless and has got charm and is highly intelligent"). With full power over all civil and military resources, Templer pushed changes through. Between August 1951 and July 1954 the communist terrorists (as they were now called) lost over half their strength, and security force and civilian casualties declined to less than one seventh of their peak. The back of the revolt was broken.

Unfortunately, Calvert was no longer in Malaya to see this happen. He had suffered from amoebic dysentery since January 1951, and in June 1951 had become seriously unwell, reportedly suffering from hepatomegaly, dysentery, malaria, hookworm and the cumulative mental and physical stress of 12 years' intensive soldiering. On 8 June 1951, the day before Calvert told his men that he had to go into hospital and would be returning to the UK, General Briggs came to the Malayan Scouts HQ at Dusan Tua and spent many hours listening to reports of operations, having discussions with the officers, and talking with Calvert alone. The next time Major John Woodhouse saw Calvert was on 12 June, at the military hospital, to say goodbye.

Malayan Scouts (SAS) Whilst all the politicking over the Briggs Plan was taking place, Calvert had been focused on implementing his last recommendation, setting up a Special Force to operate for up to three months in the deep jungle, or, in his words:"To form a special counter-insurgency force which would live, move and have its being in the jungle, alongside, in the same blood stream as the guerrillas, so that they would meet, and - if they were well trained enough, smart enough, well armed enough - they would beat them." In July 1950 Calvert was given the go-ahead to set up his counter-insurgency force as quickly as possible under the name Malayan Scouts (SAS), reporting directly to General Urquhart, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Malaya (whose attitude towards the SAS and small unit jungle patrols may best be described as ambivalent). Calvert had already started interviewing officer volunteers in Hong Kong in June 1950. The unit began forming on 1 August 1950. Recruitment was a particular problem:"I was not allowed to pick and chose my Other Ranks. I sent a request for volunteers to all the Army battalions in Hong Kong and Malaya, but I had to let the battalion commanders choose the men and send them to me. Some chose to off-load their unruly elements on me and whilst I could RTU them (return to unit), I was not allowed to pick them. I was allowed to pick and choose officers, but only from South East Asia; Hong Kong and Malaya. This was in many ways due to the very big anti-Chindit element amongst the former Indian Army officers, dating back to the Burma days."

Woodhouse in particular was a great admirer of Calvert. He said of Calvert: "As soon as I met him I knew he had that spark of genius that a solder is lucky to see at close quarters even once in his career"; "His faith and enthusiasm was infectious and exhilarating. Ideas flowed from him in a way which I had never heard from anyone else in the army...Up to that point in my life Calvert was the most impressive, free-thinking strategist I had ever met".

Despite difficulties, by the middle of August 1950 Calvert had recruited around 60 men and officers, enough to form 'A' Squadron. Initial training involved the use of air rifles and fencing masks, and live grenades. Calvert around this time also liaised with Special Branch, SOE and MI6 over the use of wartime deception programs, including doctoring of ammunition and booby-trapping. By the end of September 1950 'A' Squadron was ready for final jungle training, which Calvert himself ran in the jungle near Ipoh in the north of Malaya. His objective, he said, was to get the men "to think for themselves and not act on orders". By January 1951 they were judged ready for operations.

'A' Squadron under John Woodhouse were tasked with locating and destroying terrorist bases on the northern border of Johore with Pahang. Under the Briggs Plan, the main military effort since June 1950 had been to clear Johore of terrorists, moving methodically from South to North. The squadron had no air cover and were bogged down by the worst rains since 1926, so progress was slow, but at the end of February a three-man patrol spotted six terrorists walking through a clearing and followed them to their camp. The next day the patrol's troop attacked the camp, killing or dispersing the terrorists and capturing supplies destined for Jahore. A police post was established among the local tribes and became an intelligence source for later operations. After 3 months, 'A' Squadron returned from the jungle with its first operation deemed a success.

There to meet them back at camp were two new squadrons: 'B' Squadron had arrived from the UK in January 1951, formed from Brian Frank's 21SAS (TA) and including men from 1 and 2 SAS regiments from WW2, under Major Tony Greville-Bell; 'C' Squadron had arrived from Rhodesia in March 1951, under Major Peter Walls, after Calvert had made a recruiting visit to Rhodesia in January. Unfortunately, between March and June 1951 there were insufficient resources to train the two new squadrons to the same high level as the first squadron in small group jungle operations.

On one telling, Greville-Bell was appalled by the lack of discipline in 'A' Squadron, clashed with Calvert, resigned and returned to the UK. A third version is that Greville-Bell, having temporarily relinquished his captaincy to serve as a lieutenant in Malaya, was concerned not just about the lack of discipline, but about the camp, the accommodation, and the training facilities, which were 'inadequate for men who may have had experience of war in Europe, but had no experience of jungle fighting'. Unhappy with Calvert's responses, he complained directly to General Harding. Harding interviewed Greville-Bell and then gave him a severe dressing-down for committing the unforgivable sin of complaining over the head of his CO. Greville-Bell was 'treated as a criminal', separated from the unit and posted to another area. He eventually returned to the SAS TA in the UK where he was promoted to the substantive rank of Major in 1955, retiring the following year. Calvert himself did not mention Greville-Bell when he wrote about his time in Malaya. He dryly observed: "Allowing the men to keep their beards when they came out [from the jungle], to the outrage of the military police and the resentment of other units, was clearly a mistake". He also said that he wanted to "establish a different type of discipline" with his troops, which made them think and use their initiative. He spoke about Wingate's idea with the Chindits, that anybody can fight with brilliant volunteers, the difficulty was to do it with ordinary people – you had to retrain them to give them initiative, taking away the discipline they had beforehand. He wanted to find infantrymen "who were prepared to fight off their own bat". On his first day with Woodhouse, he reportedly said: "There are too many officers who put their preconceived ideas into practice. There is not enough thinking out there. They are so stereotyped and moulded by the service that they are incapable of change...There are no manuals or battle drills to tell us the answer. We have got to find the answers ourselves. A new sort of war requires a new sort of counter war."

Several commentators have expressed sympathy for Calvert, given the challenging environment in which he worked. John Woodhouse wrote an open letter to the SAS Association in 1981 defending Calvert's reputation. Other authors have said that Calvert has never been given proper recognition for his achievements.

In December 1951 a letter was sent from General Headquarters Far East Land Forces to the Under Secretary of State at The War Office in London about the future of the Malayan Scouts. It said: "The role of the Malayan Scouts (Special Air Service Regiment) is to operate in the deep jungle areas not already covered by other Security Forces, with the object of destroying bandit forces, their camps and their sources of supply. No other units in Malaya are so suitably organised or equipped for this task which is vital in bringing the bandits to battle. The result is that the unit is becoming a 'Corps d'Elite' in deep jungle operations and is a most valuable component of our armed forces in Malaya...The Regiment is having increasing successes in their operations all the time".The letter went on to recommend that the regiment be expanded to four squadrons, and renamed the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment.

Some see this as a vindication of Calvert's vision and commitment against the odds. Others put it in the context of a longer term chain of decisions to re-form a regular SAS unit.

In 1952 Woodhouse ran the first post-war selection course for the SAS on Mount Snowdon in Wales. He then wrote a short paper, "Some Personal Observations on the Employment of Special Forces in Malaya" which was published in the Army Quarterly in April 1953. In the paper he described Calvert's approach and called for a return to patrolling the jungle in small independent groups.

When Woodhouse returned for a second tour in Malaya in 1955 under Colonel George Lea, he served as both Squadron Commander and Training Officer, focusing on perfecting Calvert's ideas on jungle warfare. Woodhouse wrote:"I moved from troop to troop with an escort of 2 or 3 soldiers. I got to know the area well. I kept a critical eye open for anything wrong. We mostly lived the 'hard routine' (silent, unseen) as we travelled. If I found fault then I had it out with the Troop Commander on the spot first and then with his men. Exhorting, cajoling, explaining with persistence was initially exhausting to me, it seemed to be a one man crusade...but suddenly it seemed to click and come together." At the end of his tour in 1956 Colonel Lea recommended Woodhouse for an OBE. His citation states: 'Many of the techniques now proving successful on deep jungle operations were conceived and developed by him personally and have now become standard procedure throughout the Regiment".

Woodhouse later stated that "Calvert was the originator of all the basic SAS tactics in Malaya".

A final vindication for Calvert's Malayan Scouts comes in a book by Dennis Holman titled Noone of the Ulu. Published in 1958, it tells the story of two anthropologists, Richard and Pat Noone, who helped British forces build relationships with the native tribes in the deep jungle, or 'ulu'. The foreword was written by Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer, Calvert's "one man with one plan". Templer says: "Our job at the time was to destroy the terrorists, and this was absorbing all our available resources...Pat Noone had discovered a tribe inhabiting the deep jungle of the main range, which is some of the most difficult and inaccessible jungle in the world...I only became aware of this tribe when large numbers of the terrorists withdrew into their Shangri-La. The terrorists dominated the aborigines, and made vital tactical use of their wonderful skill and jungle craft. At the best of times it had been difficult for our patrols to make contact with the enemy, who kept out of fights unless they had superiority in numbers and the advantage of surprise; but now contact became virtually impossible. The terrorists' aborigine allies would not only warn them of the approach of a patrol, but lead them away to safety by secret paths known only to the guides. Moreover, the terrain was unsuitable for the deployment of troops in large numbers. The obvious solution was to deny the aborigines of the deep jungle to the terrorists. But how was this to be done, and who was going to do it? ...[that] is the substance of this story...." In telling the story, the author then mentions, by name, five members of 22SAS (Colonel George Lea, Major John Slim, Major John Cooper, Major Salmond, and Colonel Oliver Brooke). Six years after he left Malaya, the unit Calvert set up was still seeking out terrorists in the deep jungle.

Dismissal from the Army In 1952 while serving with the Royal Engineers in Hanover, Germany, Calvert was court-martialled and dismissed from the army on a charge of "gross indecency with male persons". To his death, Calvert denied that he was guilty of the charge. His biographer strongly suspects Calvert was framed. Official records relating to the trial are sealed and due to be released in 2028.

Less well known are his contributions to the post-war development of the SAS, not just in championing the SAS cause immediately after the war, but also in Malaya, where his achievements were overshadowed by the Malayan Scout's reputation for poor discipline, and by his court martial. Thompson's book was given by British diplomats to the Sultan of Oman in 1966 to provoke discussion about social change as a defence against insurgency. The changes had to wait until after the Oman coup in 1970, when the SAS returned to help the new Sultan Qaboos win the Dhofar Counterinsurgency, seen by some as the most successful counterinsurgency of modern times. Calvert's ideas led to the formation of the Malayan Scouts to fight in the deep jungle. Calvert's experience and ideas on soldier selection influenced Woodhouse, Newell and Perry who set up the first post-war SAS selection process. Their work shaped the selection process of the modern SAS.

Calvert is also remembered, perhaps unfairly, for the allegedly poor discipline of some members of 'A' Squadron Malayan Scouts between August 1950 and June 1951.

Honours and awards Distinguished Service Order 5 August 1943, 18 May 1944 Silver Star (United States) 19 September 1944 King Haakon VII's Cross of Liberty (Norway) 19 March 1948 Commander of the Order of Leopold II with Palm (Belgium) Croix de Guerre 1940 with Palm (Belgium) 14 May 1948