Amaury Kruel

Amaury Kruel (11 April 1901 – 23 August 1996) was a Brazilian military officer and politician who served as officer of the General Staff of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) in 1944–1945, head of the Federal Office of Public Security (DFSP) in 1957–1959 and Minister of War in 1962–1963. Despite initially supporting president João Goulart, Kruel later switched sides and was one of the main participants in the 1964 coup d'état at the head of the 2nd Army, from 1963 to 1966. He reached the rank of army general, being promoted to marshal when he retired. He was then a federal deputy for Guanabara from 1967 to 1971.

A friend of Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco since he was a teenager at the Military School of Porto Alegre, he participated in the Revolution of 1930 and fought in the FEB as head of the 2nd Section (information) of its General Staff. He broke his friendship with Castelo Branco (also an officer of the General Staff) at the end of 1944 due to disagreements in the Battle of Monte Castello. In the early 1950s, he supported the right in the political dispute at the Military Club and in 1954 he contributed to the downfall of João Goulart, then Minister of Labor under Getúlio Vargas, but in the following year they became personal friends. From 1957 to 1959, he was put in charge of the police forces in the capital (Rio de Janeiro) through the DFSP by president Juscelino Kubitschek. His anti-crime measures led to the first iteration of what would be called the "Death Squad". He had some diplomatic assignments in his career, almost being an ambassador in 1961. Kruel also owned land and worked in the business sector.

In 1961, he supported Goulart's inauguration as president of Brazil in the Legality Campaign. Until 1963, as head of the Military Cabinet and the Ministry of War, he was the president's strong man in the Brazilian Army, setting up a military apparatus to prevent a coup and apply political pressure. He was a right-wing figure in the government and conflicts with the left led to his fall from office. In his next command, the 2nd Army, responsible for São Paulo and Mato Grosso, Kruel was already in contact with the conspirators against the president. Even so, after the outbreak of the coup in 1964, he offered his support to Goulart if the president broke with the left. With the refusal, Kruel sent troops to Brasília, Paraná and the Paraíba Valley. His conference with general Armando de Moraes Ancora in Resende marked the end of loyalist resistance in the 1st Army.

After the coup, Kruel was a pre-candidate in the indirect election won by Castelo Branco, representing a tendency towards the center, associated with the deposed government. He was responsible for political repression under his authority during the military dictatorship. He participated in the conspiracy of São Paulo governor Ademar de Barros with various disgruntled sectors, including the Communist Party, for a "countercoup" against Castelo Branco, but it was unsuccessful. Ademar was removed without resisting in 1966 and Kruel went into reserve when the government wanted to transfer him from command. In his last years in public life he was an opposition federal deputy.

Family and possessions A descendant of German immigrants, Kruel was the son of farmer José Carlos Kruel and Ana Weber Kruel. His brother Riograndino (1898–1989) and nephew Vinícius were also generals. Riograndino Kruel led the tenentist revolt in the 10th Independent Cavalry Regiment in Bela Vista, present-day Mato Grosso do Sul, at the time of the São Paulo Revolt of 1924, ending his career heading the Federal Police Department in 1964–1966. Vinícius Kruel was a major in 1964, serving at the 2nd Army HQ,

In January 1949 he was responsible for the 2nd Section of the 1st Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, when he took a special information course and was in charge of an inquiry into communist activities in the Brazilian Army. While not arousing mistrust among the military right, Kruel was a friend of the president, making him one of the most influential officials, possibly more so than the Minister of War. Kruel maintained Goulart's mandate in the army, devising a defense scheme, isolating the conspirators who subverted the government and ensuring the obedience of various military currents.

According to deputy Wilson Fadul, a week after taking office in September, he accompanied Goulart and Kruel on a fishing trip to Bananal Island. Kruel simply suggested closing Congress, restoring the lost presidential powers to parliamentarism negotiated by congressmen, and passing the base reforms proposed by Goulart via decree. Goulart did not accept this proposal. Kruel accompanied the president on his trip to the United States in April 1962, and was impressed by the Strategic Air Command base in Nebraska.

Military policy also had an offensive use. In June–July 1962, Kruel engineered military pressure on Congress in the interval between the end of the parliamentary cabinet of Tancredo Neves and the beginning of that of Brochado da Rocha. The new cabinet was more suited to Goulart's goal, to bring forward the plebiscite to restore his presidential powers, and Kruel was one of only two military names preserved by the new ministry. According to Moniz Bandeira, Kruel had offered to close Congress during Tancredo's term; impatient with parliamentarism, he would defend a self-coup, but Goulart did not accept it. With the fall of Minister of War Nélson de Melo in October, Kruel took his place. Presidentialism was then restored in January 1963.

Crisis in the ministry

At the head of the Ministry of War, Kruel was the target of criticism and invitations to conspire against Goulart, and also tried to push the government to the right. He was an arm to the right of the president's support base, matched on the left by Brizola, general Osvino Ferreira Alves and the sergeants movement. In 1963, with presidentialism restored and the military opposition isolated, the support base came into conflict.

In April, a rally of the Popular Mobilization Front was planned in Guanabara, which was governed by the oppositionist Carlos Lacerda; the president gave speeches in Marília, declaring himself to be more anti-Communist than Lacerda; Kruel announced that the army was ready to "carbonize the centers of unrest". Jacob Gorender and Moniz Bandeira, the latter based on accusations made in O Semanário, described these events as part of a maneuver for Lacerda to react violently to the demonstrators, justifying federal intervention in Guanabara and the neutralization of its governor. At the same time, this would allow Kruel to attack general Osvino (commander of the 1st Army, based in Guanabara), the General Workers Command (CGT) and Miguel Arraes, the leftist governor of Pernambuco. However, Bandeira considered Goulart would be afraid of also attacking the left. General Osvino denounced the rally, dismantling the planned operation.

Osvino made public statements of political support for the president, displeasing Kruel. Discontent arose and the name of Jair Dantas Ribeiro was discussed as the next minister of war. Goulart called Kruel and Osvino to a meeting in Brasília to cool the tensions, but the conflict continued to grow. Brizola began to attack Kruel, and in May he entered into conflict with general Antônio Carlos Muricy, commander in Rio Grande do Norte. Muricy received the solidarity of many officers, and Brizola demanded his resignation from the president, but Kruel did not accept it.

The candidacy of sergeants to run in the 1962 elections was a legal controversy, and Kruel was pressing the Supreme Federal Court to declare their ineligibility. The sergeants attacked Kruel's administration, and deputy sergeant Antônio Garcia Filho called him on Rádio Mayrink Veiga the "greatest protector of pimping here, smuggler and corrupt". In May there was a ceremony for sergeants and warrant officers in honor of general Osvino. In the presence of trade union representatives, peasants, students and politicians, sub-lieutenant Jelcy Rodrigues Corrêa spoke: "we will take our work tools and carry out the reforms together with the people, and let the reactionary gentlemen remember that the military's work tool is the rifle". As Minister of War, Kruel considered such politicization of the soldiers as an attack on discipline, calling it "sergeantism". He ordered the arrest of those involved and received the support of 51 officers, both anti-Goulart and 1961 loyalists.

Goulart could not stand the pressure, and Kruel's downfall was increasingly likely. In June 1963 the three military ministers were replaced. Kruel's departure was possibly "the moment when Goulart began to lose control of the military situation". Kruel's successor, Jair Dantas Ribeiro, represented a more left-wing military policy and did not have as much control over the Brazilian Army.

The 2nd Army and relationship with the conspirators

The conflict in the government's support base was viewed favorably by the military opposition, which tried to take advantage of it. When Kruel traveled to Rio de Janeiro, where he had been transferred to the War Material sector, he was received by a crowd of generals, including Mascarenhas de Morais and Cordeiro de Farias. They suggested that he refuse to hand over the Ministry of War, but he refused to conspire against the president. Kruel was promoted to army general in November.

However, unlike the other participants in the coup, Kruel still wanted to leave the president an alternative. His priority was not to unseat him, but to impose a turn to the right in the government. In his second call, at 22:00, and in the last, around midnight, in the presence of the generals, Kruel offered his support if Goulart closed down the CGT and other popular organizations, intervened in the trade unions and removed the auxiliaries most associated with radicalism, such as Abelardo Jurema, Minister of Labor, and Darcy Ribeiro, from the Civilian Cabinet. However, Goulart estimated that he would become a mere decorative president. To the second phone call, Goulart replied: "I am a political man", who could not break with his allies in the parties and trade unions. Their principles conflicted. In the last phone call, with the conversation seeming like an ultimatum, Goulart's tone became ceremonious, declaring, according to the sources:

And then hung up the phone.

Military operations

According to what he had heard from Goulart, Kruel was already putting the troops out on the streets. Shortly before midnight, he opened the door of his office and to an antechamber of colonels and majors, he said: "here is my order. I have already determined the displacement of the 2nd Army to Rio de Janeiro". He issued a proclamation talking about "saving the homeland in danger, freeing it from the red yoke", without, however, mentioning the president, still trying to wall him up without deposing him. Word spread across the country and reached Congress. Mourão Filho, who was leading Operation Popeye from Minas Gerais, felt relieved that he was no longer isolated. Military testimonies considered Kruel indispensable for the success of the coup. Due to being respected among a large part of the officers, many waited for his position before joining the coup, such as the commanders of Fort Copacabana, the Amazon Military Command and the 3rd Cavalry Division.

On 1 April, the 2nd Army ordered internal control in São Paulo, the march of the 16th Battalion of Hunters from Cuiabá to Brasília, passing through Jataí, and the advance of the forces from São Paulo towards Guanabara through the Paraíba valley. At dawn the valley regiments, until then held back by general Zerbini, began to accept Kruel's authority. In Guanabara, general Ancora's 1st Army sent the School Unit Group to face the São Paulo offensive.

Halfway down Via Dutra was the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras (AMAN) in the municipality of Resende. After 02:00 in the morning, Kruel telephoned its commander, general Emílio Garrastazu Médici, and obtained free passage for the 2nd Army. A battle of the loyalists against the 2nd Army and AMAN soldiers seemed inevitable. Kruel suggested to Médici that he make a defense with the regular forces available in the area, but instead Médici positioned the Cadets Corps on the road, blocking the advance of the School Units Group's soldiers. They made contact near Barra Mansa in the afternoon. The most advanced echelon of the 2nd Army stayed further back, in Resende.

Kruel's change of sides was one of the reasons for Goulart's departure from Rio de Janeiro at 12:45. The military apparatus in the 1st Army began to crumble. In the afternoon, general Ancora, who responded temporarily for the Ministry of War, agreed with Kruel a conference at AMAN to negotiate. When Kruel arrived at 18:00, Ancora acknowledged the military defeat of the 1st Army. His troops were withdrawn without engaging in combat. The tone was not very friendly. Kruel stated: "you just came to say good night! You're no longer a minister and don't think about resisting!" An important point of the meeting was the recognition of Costa e Silva's tenure at the Ministry of War, blocking the occupation of the position by Castelo Branco.

On 2 April, the 3rd Army remained, to where Goulart went to, where there were still loyalists in Rio Grande do Sul. The 5th Military Region/Infantry Division, in Paraná and Santa Catarina, already participated in the coup and was transferred from the 3rd to the 2nd Army. Tactical Group 4 was sent from São Paulo to Curitiba. Kruel issued a proclamation to the military of Rio Grande do Sul. According to Cordeiro de Farias, he had a personal reckoning to do with Leonel Brizola, using the forces sent by Paraná. They stayed in Curitiba and then returned, as Goulart left Rio Grande do Sul and there was no more loyalist resistance.

Career in the military dictatorship

Post-coup d'état With Goulart's fall, Kruel traveled to Rio de Janeiro on 3 April. His position at the time was that the military should not be in power. However, when the succession of a military officer to the presidency of Brazil became clear, Kruel was considered as a possible candidate, although the favorite one was Castelo Branco. Ademar de Barros endorsed his name, as it was customary for governors to propose the generals of their states, before supporting Castelo Branco. Kruel was considered a centrist general. Costa e Silva was in favor of the anti-Castelo candidacy. Sectors of the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), Goulart's party, defended Kruel's candidacy as a way, albeit ineffective, to bring together what was left of the military left, and a few politicians saw it as a way to preserve the power of the PTB alliance with the Social Democratic Party (PSD). On the other hand, precisely because of his association with Goulart, Kruel's candidacy was frowned upon by many officers, who also did not accept him for having a troop command post. Kruel's supporters offered Eurico Gaspar Dutra, another alternative candidate for Castelo, to join forces, but he declined. Kruel abandoned his candidacy in the name of military unity.

Kruel was one of the supporters of the "cleaning operation", articulating, together with the Department of Political and Social Order, the immediate arrest of leftist leaders, especially of the CGT, starting on 1 April. He ordered the purge of military personnel considered leftist and identified by the General Staff of the Second Army. The National Truth Commission named Kruel as one of those responsible for "managing structures and carrying out procedures aimed at committing serious violations of human rights".

"Countercoup" and final years in politics

Politically, Kruel was one of the "independent officers" with no clear faction. In 1966, he supported the Minister of War Costa e Silva in his dispute with Castelo Branco. Since 1964 he had some involvement in conspiracies against Castelo Branco, allied with Ademar de Barros, whose deposition by the federal government was possible. According to a report that reached the Guanabara Security Secretariat in 1965, a colonel visited João Goulart in exile in Uruguay claiming to represent Kruel. He allegedly said that "we are in a position to overthrow the Caestelo (sic) government, as long as the former president no longer thinks about three things: CGT, communism and Brizola". Ademar intensified his articulations in the first half of 1966, uniting discontent from leftist groups such as the Communist Party to former coup supporters in a "countercoup" project.

In addition to his alliance with Ademar, Kruel worked against Castelo Branco due to the frustration of his plan to run for governor of São Paulo. The Ineligibility Law (applied to all ministers under Goulart from 1963) and the Electoral Domicile Law (requiring an electoral domicile of four years or more to run in elections in the contested state) prevented Kruel's candidacy. General Joaquim Justino Alves Bastos, of the 3rd Army, had the same frustration and participated in the plan. An emissary arrested at the Uruguayan border in 1966 was found with documents linking both to Uruguayan asylum seekers. The planned revolt would depend on the strength of both for a possible armed conflict. There was a plan to restore general Zerbini to command. The objectives of the "countercoup" would be direct elections, restitution of closed political parties and the abolition of the Institutional Acts.

Under increasing pressure from the federal government, Ademar de Barros ended up giving in without resistance, being removed from office for corruption in 1966. Castelo Branco summoned Kruel and informed him of his intention to depose Ademar. Kruel, whose loyalty the government already doubted, made no objection and personally handed over the copy of the Diário Oficial da União with the act of removal, keeping the 2nd Army in readiness. The general also fell under the radar, being informed of his irrevocable transfer to the General Staff of the Army, in Rio de Janeiro. It was the same maneuver previously used by Goulart against Castelo Branco. Kruel deviated from the measure by asking to go to the reserve. With that, he was automatically promoted to marshal. On 11 August, Kruel launched a manifesto against the dictatorship, calling the recent impeachments "an instrument to elect candidates of the personal liking of the head of the Executive branch". Riograndino Kruel tried to intercede for his brother with the president, and failing that, he resigned as head of the Federal Police Department.

At that time Kruel criticized political repression, indirect elections and the regime's direction. For the Brazilianist Maud Chirio, Kruel acted out of "frustrated ambitions, a feeling of illegitimacy of power and real liberal concerns". The manifesto had so much repercussion that Diário de S. Paulo announced Kruel's arrest, which did not happen. He ran in the 1966 elections for the opposition party Brazilian Democratic Movement, winning an alternate seat as federal deputy for Guanabara. In this position, held from 1966 to 1971, he was an effective member of the Security Commission and defended the creation of a state-owned company for nuclear technology. At the end of his term, Kruel withdrew from public life, dedicating himself to his farm in Linhares and business work.