Ratnakīrti

Ratnakīrti (11th century CE) was an Indian Buddhist philosopher of the Yogācāra and epistemological (pramāṇavāda) schools who wrote on logic, philosophy of mind and epistemology. Ratnakīrti studied at the Vikramaśīla monastery in modern-day Bihar. He was a pupil of Jñānaśrīmitra, and Ratnakīrti refers to Jñānaśrīmitra in his work as his guru with phrases such as yad āhur guravaḥ.

Ratnakīrti's work has been termed as "more concise and logical though not so poetical" compared to that of his teacher, although he does build on much of Jñānaśrīmitra's work.

Life

Ratnakīrti was active sometime between 1000 and 1050 CE. Among his contemporaries at Vikramashila were Ratnākaraśānti and Jñanasrimitra. Ratnakīrti engaged with both of them on an intellectual level and it is clear that Ratnakīrti was Jñānaśrīmitra's student on subjects relating to logico-epistemological topics as the former often quotes the latter as his "guru".

With Ratnākaraśānti, the relationship was more complex as it is likely that Ratnakīrti was his pupil on topics related to tantra however Yuichi Kajiyama states that "Ratnākaraśānti learned Buddhism, exoteric and esoteric, under Ratnakīrti and others."

Ratnakīrti quotes from Jñānaśrīmitra's Sākārasiddhiśāstra:If one’s own mind is distinct from another by nature, it should appear together with a limiting object (avadhi), [i.e., another mind]. [Therefore, one’s own mind should not be distinct from another.] Nor should it be apprehended that [one’s own mind] is identical with [another mind]. This means that any knowledge of a distinction between two things depends on perceiving those two things, and seeing how they are different. However, one can only perceive one's own mind. Therefore, one’s mind cannot be shown to be distinct from other minds (at the same time, one's own mind also cannot be shown to be identical to other minds since, again, this knowledge would be based on perceiving other minds as well).

Inami observes that Ratnakīrti's view of other minds resembles Prajñākaragupta's and Jñānaśrīmitra's views on causality and validity. According to Prajñākaragupta and Jñānaśrīmitra, in order for causality to be established, two things must be perceived. Yet two things are never perceived in reality. Similarly, validity requires a correspondence based on two cognitions. However, each cognition reveals only its own object, but not a correspondence with another. In this way, nonduality is accepted as ultimate, and causality and validity are conventional. Similarly, Ratnakīrti maintains that a distinction between one's own and other minds cannot be accepted ultimately, since such a distinction is never known. At the same time, he does not deny that other minds exist conventionally.

Ratnakīrti provides three consequences which would follow if the distinction between one's own mind and another were accepted. First, one would also have to accept a distinction between one's own mind and external objects, which all Vijñānavādins deny. Second, if a distinction between two things which are never perceived together is accepted, it would follow that causality would be established as well. This is because, although cause and effect are never apprehended together (since only one of them exists at a time), a distinction must nonetheless be accepted. In such a way, causality, which implies a distinction between cause and effect, would be accepted. However, this would contradict Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, which states that causality exists only conventionally. Third, if a distinction exists between minds, the non-duality of cognition defended by Vijñānavādins would be "refuted by perception grasping a distinction. Since cognition has nonduality, no distinction can be perceived." Since this non-duality of minds only applies at the level of ultimate truth, Ratnakīrti does not think this invalidates the Mahayana path which is based on compassion for all beings (who do exist at the level of conventional truth).

Ratnakīrti responds to an objection that, although other minds cannot be proven to exist, the nonexistence of other minds cannot be proven either. Ratnakīrti's solution aims to reject other minds by implication, by denying the distinction between one's own and other minds, rather than disproving other minds directly. That is, according to Inami, Ratnakīrti "considers that the denial of the distinction implies the nonexistence of other minds." Thus, by "denying the distinction between one’s own mind and another, Ratnakīrti proves the nonexistence of another mind." Similarly, according to Inami, for Ratnakīrti:

...the denial of other minds does not mean the affirmation of the sole existence of one’s own mind. Ratnakīrti, who refuses the distinction between one’s own mind and others, must deny not only the existence of other minds but also the existence of one’s own mind. For the notion of “one’s own mind” also depends on the same distinction. When the distinction disappears, even one’s own mind cannot survive at all. Moreover, if the notion of “one’s own” or “self” were admitted, the ātmavāda would be accepted. The ultimate reality is the direct object of perception, the only object of consciousness which is not associated with mental construction (vikalpa).

Thus, for Ratnakīrti, at the level of ultimate truth, there is nothing but a single multifaceted image which also includes self-awareness (svasaṃvedana). This is the single ground of all individuation and conceptual constructions (out of which the individual mindstreams and myriad mental experiences are constructed).

Ratnakīrti's monistic interpretation of Yogācāra is known as the Citrādvaitavāda school (the view of variegated non-duality) or Vijñānādvaitavāda school (the view of non-dual consciousness).

Other views Ratnakīrti's "Refutation of Arguments Establishing Īśvara" (Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa) argued against the Hindu concept of a creator God. He wrote that it is not possible to establish Īśvara through inference as the Naiyāyikas did. The text begins with an explanation of the Nyāya belief system, followed by a criticism of inferences that establish an intelligent creator.

Ratnakīrti's "Proof of Exclusion" (Apohasiddhi) establishes a theory of exclusion that follows Dignāga's theory of the same. It explains how thoughts and perception become understood through inference, and it is a theory of definitions and meaning-making. There are three types of exclusion described in the text.

Works Works attributed to Ratnakīrti include: