Henry of Harclay

Henry (of) Harclay (, also Harcla or Harcley; c. 1270 – 25 June 1317) was an English medieval philosopher and university chancellor.

Biography Harclay was born in the Diocese of Carlisle near the English and Scottish borders. Harclay's family descended from "an old but minor knightly family" of modest origins that gave them their surname Harclay from Hartley; the family name had "considerable variation in the spelling… including: Herkeley, Harkeley, Archilay, Harcla, [etc.]" (Harclay xvii). Harclay had one sister and six brothers; one of which also brings celebrity to the family name. Andrew Harclay, 1st Earl of Carlisle was a controversial figure in his time and was also known for his political and military accomplishments during the Anglo-Scottish wars in the early 14th century. Harclay's father Michael was a sheriff in the county of Cumberland between 1285 and 1298 (Harclay xvii). In that same year of 1296, the Bishop of Carlisle appointed him to be the Rector of the church at Dacre on Christmas Day. He remained a secular theologian until 1297 when he was ordained as a priest. (Harclay xviii). It is believed that during this period William of Ockham studied under Harclay.

The Bishop of Lincoln, John Dalderby, confirmed Henry of Harclay as the Chancellor of the University of Oxford. Harclay was very active and devotedly attentive towards "maintaining the order of the university" (M.G. Henninger 305). A highly contentious and bitter controversy arose during his tenure as chancellor between him and the Dominicans over the confirmation of certain privileges accorded to the university by the king. These included King Edward II’s decree that the mayor of Oxford "admit the chancellor and procurators of the university to the periodic testing of beer" (M.G. Henninger 305). Harclay's "principle work is a wide-ranging, philosophically rich series of twenty-nine Quaestiones ordinariae" or Ordinary Questions (Pasnau, 882). who strongly influenced Harclay's works. This influence is especially prevalent in Harclay's commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences, where he "frequently uses Scotus's arguments and adopts many of his positions" (M.G. Henninger 305).

Principal ideas Harclay's most popular, and at the time of his writing, controversial, claims are those that concern ideas about the eternity of the world and the infinite, and the univocal concept of being. He attacked basic assumptions of those who argued the eternity of the world was impossible and that "all infinites are equal" (Dales 298).

On the infinite and the eternity of the world Harclay addresses arguments against this such as that infinite time creates infinite souls and therefore infinite power (equal or greater than God's), and that greater and lesser infinites would ensue (Dales 298–299). He refutes the first by claiming: "An infinity of multitude is not inconsistent with souls, although an infinity of power would be…for all these souls taken together will not make one infinite power…therefore, [these] infinite souls do not constitute some species of number, but a multitude of infinite numbers…for it is a contradiction that one number contain every number…for then it would contain itself, which is impossible" (Harclay 757). Harclay believes he shows the possibility of greater and lesser infinites by referencing the revolutions of planets, and that "the quantity of four feet is not divisible into as many infinite parts of the same quantity of eight feet" (Harclay 769). These quantities are infinitely divisible, yet one would have "more parts of the same quantity in the double quantity…even if we carry on [dividing] to infinity" (Harclay 769).

On the univocal concept of being Harclay believes it is necessary for there to be univocal concepts for it to be possible to make inquiries into God's nature. If things such as the definition of what it means to exist is equivocal between God and his creatures, then when we say "God exists" really we are just saying "God is God" so we have not proven anything and consequently are prevented from knowing anything about God (Harclay 461). Harclay continues until he reaches the conclusion that: hatever formally pertains to God and to creatures is not ascribed equivocally, since comparison can be made [only] according to something common. (M. Henninger 215).

As for substance and accidents, he says that univocal commonality is also present because this unity of relation is not a being (either substance or accident) but a concept. This is because if there is not a difference between "the concept of being predicated of a substance, and the concept of a substance" it would be impossible for anyone to distinguish between an accident of a substance and the substance itself (M. Henninger 215).